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## HAWAIIAN *INDEPENDENCE*—NOT “ANNEXATION,” OUR POLICY.

### “ANNEXATION” ENDANGERS DOMESTIC SUGAR.

It is conceded that the “annexation” of the Hawaiian Islands is not a *new* “scheme,” but it is asserted that it is the necessary and fitting sequel to our relations with Hawaii for three-quarters of a century. The writer controverts this as an erroneous inference. We insist that the *independence* of those Islands, their freedom from all foreign control or domination (that of the United States included) has been our policy; that the “scheme” of “annexation” *without the consent of the people* and the rightful rulers of Hawaii was not, until 1893, entertained for a moment by the United States. This assertion—which amounts to joining issue with the President, is not overcome by the fact that the Hawaiian government has sought on at least two occasions to cede the Islands to the United States when they were threatened internally, as in 1854 (See House Ex. Doc. 1, part 1, 53d, 3d, pp. 106, 124, 127), or externally as in 1851 (See same Doc., pp. 89, 92, 102), but that goes very far from proving the President’s position to be correct! In fact the one was but a conditional cession and withdrawn or allowed to lapse by Hawaii, p. 132, and in the latter case Secretary Webster *ordered the deed of cession returned*. (See same Doc., p. 102.)

These facts are a matter of record, there is no escape from them, and they tend to prove *the very reverse* of the President’s assumption! In 1851, when Secretary Webster ordered the cession of the Islands to the United States, returned, he said—

“You will see by my official letter \* \* \* the disposition of the United States is to maintain its *independence*. Beyond that you will not proceed. The act of contingent or conditional surrender (of the Islands to the United States) which you mention in your letter as having been placed in your hands, *you will please to return* to the Hawaiian government.” But over and beyond that, there is ample evidence in the record to show that the United States always insisted on the independence of the Hawaiian Islands, and has not coveted

or looked with favor on "annexation," save and except in some extremity, to prevent the Islands falling to another power, of which there is not now a pretense of the remotest danger. *Neither the President nor Secretary Sherman lends that idea the least recognition.* In fact, Secretary Sherman says that the present government in Hawaii is "firmly established." These things being true, where is the necessity of "annexation"? From external danger the United States has long guaranteed the independence of the Islands, and from internal disorder we may not rightfully intervene.

As early as December 31, 1842, President Tyler sent to Congress, correspondence had between certain "agents" of Hawaii and our Secretary of State with a message recommending an appropriation for our Consul at Honolulu. He therein assumed that it would be in conformity with the wishes of our government and our people that the Hawaiian community—"should be respected and all its rights strictly and "conscientiously regarded \* \* \* While its nearer approach "to this continent and the intercourse which American vessels "have with the Islands could not but create dissatisfaction "on the part of the United States, any attempt by another "power (should such an attempt be threatened or feared) to "take possession of the Islands, colonize them and subvert "the native government! \* \* \* it is deemed not unfit "to make the declaration that *our government seeks no peculiar "advantages*, no exclusive control over the Hawaiian government, but is content with its *independent* existence and "anxiously wishes for its security and prosperity. Its forbearance in this respect under the circumstances of its very "large intercourse with the Islands would gratify this government (should events hereafter arise to require it) in making "a decided remonstrance against the adoption of an opposite "policy by any other power."—(Cong. Globe, 27th, 3d, p. 103.)

Who can possibly predicate the present scheme of "annexation" upon such sentiments as these, wherein the United States is made to seek no exclusive control, no peculiar advantages, being fully and conscientiously content with the *independence* of those Islands; the people thereof to be free and independent of *all* foreign control or domination! And what followed this? In 1843 Mr. Webster, as Secretary of State, secured from England and France the signatures of their representatives to a treaty, agreement or protocol wherein they expressly relinquished all claim to the control, seizure, or domination of the Sandwich Islands, from which it is to be fairly implied *that the United States would pursue a like policy.*

Again, and on the 15th of March, 1843, Mr. Webster as

Secretary of State said—in a communication to Mr. Brown, our Commissioner at Honolulu—"We seek no control over the Hawaiian government nor any undue influence what-ever. Our only wish is that the integrity and *independence* of the Hawaiian territory *may be scrupulously maintained* \* \*."

December, 1842, Mr. Webster, as Secretary of State, had said that the President was quite willing to declare as the sense of the United States, that—"no power ought either to take possession of the Sandwich Islands as a conquest or for the purpose of colonization and that no power ought to seek *any undue control* over the existing government \* \*."

"No power" embraces the United States as well as other nations. Our continuous policy toward the Hawaiian Islands, starting with their recognition, has been an insistence on their neutrality; their independence or freedom from all foreign control.

In President Taylor's message of December 4, 1849, he alluded to the Sandwich Islands, saying—"We desire that the Islands may maintain *their independence*, and that other nations shall concur with us in this sentiment." And very properly he added that we could in no event be indifferent to their passing under the dominion of any other power.

Mr. Clayton, our Secretary of State, said to Mr. Rives, our Minister to France, July 5, 1850—"We desire that those Islands (Hawaiian) should maintain *their independence*. We believe that their existing government is competent to discharge the duties of a sovereign state," and he expressed the hope that the then existing trouble or dispute between France and the Hawaiian Islands would come to speedy and satisfactory termination, but if not, that France be informed that the United States could not allow the Islands—"to pass under the dominion or exclusive control of any other power." And he added—what is very pertinent just now—"we (i. e., the United States) *do not ourselves covet sovereignty over them*. We would be content that they should remain under their present rulers \* \* \*."

In Mr. Webster's letter to Mr. Rives of June 19, 1851, he says— \* \* \* "If you should not already have made the French government acquainted with the interest we feel in the *independence* of the (Hawaiian) Islands, you will lose no time in taking that course." The Secretary asserted that the action of the French Admiral in landing troops and taking possession of the government buildings in 1849, was incompatible with any just regard for the Hawaiian government as an *independent* state. Again in his letter of July 14, 1851, to Mr. Severance, our Commissioner at Hono-

lulu, Mr. Webster still more clearly outlined our policy toward the Hawaiian Islands, and it would seem to most effectually dispose of the modern assumption of the Hawaiian sugar lobby at Washington that the United States has for years favored "annexation." In that letter Mr. Webster, after pointing out that the United States were the first to acknowledge the national existence of the Hawaiian government and to treat it as an independent state, says—"In acknowledging "the *independence* of the Islands and of the government established over them, it (i. e., the United States) *was not seeking to promote any peculiar object of its own*. What it did, and all that it did was done openly in the face of day, in entire good faith, and known to all nations. \* \* \* This government still desires to see the nationality of the Hawaiian government maintained, its *independent* administration of public affairs respected and its prosperity and reputation increased. "But while thus indisposed to exercise *any sinister influence itself* over the councils of Hawaii, or *to overawe the proceedings of its government by the menace or the actual application of superior military force*, it expects to see other powerful nations act in the same manner"!

Not only has the *independence* of the Islands been our policy; not only was the United States to exercise no sinister influence over them; but Mr. Webster especially states that we were not to—"overawe the proceedings of its (lawful) government "by the menace or the actual application of superior military force."

And yet *that is precisely what* the oligarchy and Stevens succeeded in using *our flag and forces* to accomplish in January, 1893.

Mr. Webster proceeded to state—"The United States expects to see other nations act in the same spirit. \* \* \* "Our policy is, that while the Government of the United States, itself faithful to its original assurance, scrupulously regards the *independence* of the Hawaiian Islands, it can never consent to see those Islands taken possession of by either of the great commercial powers of Europe. \* \* \*"

Can there be any quibble—diplomatic or otherwise, made over this language? The *independence* of the Hawaiian Islands; no interference—save protection by the United States *to preserve that independence*. The very antipodes of "annexation." And Mr. Webster further said that he had the assurance of the French Minister that France had—"no purpose whatever of taking possession of the Islands. \* \* \*" And this is proven by the fact that when the French took possession of the Hawaiian government building, etc.,

August 25, 1849, it carefully abstained from taking down the Hawaiian flag. France, even at that early period, did not look to an occupation of the Islands. She simply wanted reparation for alleged treaty infractions by Hawaii. (House Ex. Doc. 1, part 1, 53d, 3d, pp. 13-75.)

In his message of December 2, 1851, President Fillmore alluded to the difference which had, since 1849, been pending between the French and the Hawaiian Islands, expressing the hope that they would "be peaceably adjusted, so as to secure the *independence* of those islands." He pointed out that we had been first to acknowledge the independence of the Sandwich Islands, influenced by their importance as a place of refuge and refreshment for our vessels, and influenced by a desire that the islands "should not pass under the control of any great maritime State, but should remain in an *independent* condition and so be accessible and useful to the commerce of *all nations*."

We are unable to see any "annexation" in that!

We are aware that in 1854 when Mr. Marcy was Secretary of State and when the internal dissensions in the Hawaiian Islands threatened a collapse of the government, that the Secretary of State listened to a proposition of "annexation" proceeding *from the lawful ruling King and his people*. (House Ex. Doc. 1, part 1, pp. 121-133. 53d -3d.) ✓

But all the Secretary of State then said was that it was—"not the policy of the United States to accelerate" annexation, but that if it became "unavoidable" the United States would much prefer to acquire the sovereignty of the Islands for the United States than see them transferred to any other power. "Annexation" at that time was proposed by *the people* of the Islands and the King was disposed to concur. Certain Americans were just as selfishly impatient then—forty-three years ago, as they are now! The idea expressed in the Gregg-Marcy treaty was, that the Islands be admitted *as a State*, and that \$300,000 a year be paid by the United States to be divided between the King, chiefs and his successors to the throne. Objection was then made to Hawaii coming in *as a State* and also to the amount of the annuity; \$100,000 was thought sufficient. An important feature running through all the Secretary's dispatches was that in any treaty of "annexation" *the people* should be consulted, as well as the rulers! In his dispatch of January 31, 1855, the Secretary said—

"If the Hawaiian government *and people* become convinced of the *necessity* of such a change (i. e., annexation) it is probable that they will, *if left to their own choice*, look

“to the United States as the country to which they would wish to be annexed.”

That was a very different matter than taking a cession from an oligarchy that acquired possession by deception and the use of our flag and forces.

In his letters to Mr. Comly in 1881, Mr. Blaine just as firmly states our policy toward the Hawaiian Islands, as had his predecessors in office and our Presidents. For instance, writing November 19, 1881, he says—“The government of the United States has, with unvarying consistency manifested respect for the *independence* of the Hawaiian Kingdom and an earnest desire for the welfare of its people. \* \* \* The government of the United States has always avowed and now repeats, that under no circumstances, will it permit the transfer of the territory or sovereignty of these Islands to any of the great European powers.”

That was but a repetition of what had been stated many times over by our government. The *independence* of the Islands; no transfer of them to a foreign power. “Annexation” as now tendered to the United States would be inconsistent with all our professions. The *independence* of the Islands was and is our strongest argument to meet foreign domination and of course that forbids “annexation.”

December 1, 1881, Mr. Blaine again says to Mr. Comly—“The *material possession* of Hawaii is not desired by the United States any more than was that of Cuba, but under no circumstances can the United States permit any change in the territorial control of either which would cut it adrift from the American system, etc.”

The *independence* of Hawaii and of Cuba are very different from the jingo “annexation” scheme. And in the same letter Mr. Blaine says—

“The United States firmly believes that the position of the Hawaiian Islands, as the key to the domination of the American Pacific, demands their *benevolent neutrality*, to which end the United States will earnestly co-operate with the *native* government.”

And then he said—and this is about all the jingoes have to rely upon; that—“if through any cause the maintenance of such a position of benevolent neutrality, should be found by Hawaii to be *impracticable*, this government would then unhesitatingly meet the altered situation by seeking an avowedly American solution for the grave issues presented.”

It has been the serious effort of the Hawaiian “Sugar Trust” and its diplomatic and other agents to so manipulate matters—“bring things to a smash” (See House Ex. Doc. 1,



part I, p. 737) as to seem to bring their tottering oligarchy *within the range of this undefined policy of Mr. Blaine*. They have tried to get into a row with Japan in order to make benevolent neutrality "impracticable" and "annexation" thereby necessary and "unavoidable," but they have failed in this. There has never been—for a moment, any serious pretense that the independence or "neutrality" of the Hawaiian Islands was in peril or in any way menaced! The only thing menaced is *the oligarchy*! The despotism of a few who—under the cloak of "peaceable" citizens, conspired to obtain the use of our flag and our troops to overawe a lawful ruler and induce her to surrender—as she supposed, to the United States, with the promise that we would arbitrate the matter! If the independence of the Islands has come to be "impracticable," it must have been rendered so by the antics of the oligarchy *to create the conditions*, which only proves how unworthy it is of confidence, support and trust, and what a mistake it was to overthrow the lawful ruler in 1893.

In 1887, Secretary Bayard said to our Minister Merrill: "As is well known, no intent is cherished nor policy entertained by the United States which is otherwise than friendly to the autonomical control and *independence* of Hawaii."

Beyond all question, our insistence on the *independence* of the Hawaiian group has been continuous, honest and honorable. It has not embraced the art of the conspirator, nor the "diplomacy" of the Hawaiian "Sugar Trust." That policy does not absolve the United States from pursuing the same course which we have forced upon foreign nations. We did not demand the independence of those Islands *in order to take them ourselves*! Nor should we "annex" them simply because a few selfish sugar planters may *have created conditions* which they may not be able to maintain or control and which are over and beyond the neutrality and the independence of the Islands.

This "annexation" boil on the body politic of the United States appears to break out at intervals. It seems to lie dormant at times as if germinating and gathering pus. Thirty-one years ago there was a violent "annexation" eruption in the House of Representatives, when the "Foreign Relations" Committee reported a bill to the effect, that whenever Great Britain and the several provinces composing Canada should accept "annexation" the President should declare by proclamation that Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Lower and Upper Canada, Selkirk, Saskatchewan and Columbia, should be admitted into the United States as States or Territories!

That was "annexation" by the wholesale, and yet there was some little sense in it compared with this Hawaiian "scheme" because Canada is valuable *coterminous* territory. The only wonder, however, is that the jingoes didn't suggest the "annexation" of the whole of Europe and part of Asia! England has already annexed Boston and the suburbs, nearly all of Newport and Bar Harbor, the best part of Washington, all of Fifth Avenue and outlying districts on Long Island and well up the Hudson. Over this "annexed" territory British sentiment in certain circles is supreme. The British have also annexed scores and hundreds of the loveliest American heiresses to replenish depleted bank accounts. In fact, "annexation" is a British idea! England has annexed too much! Her West India Islands are to-day sending up a "reciprocity" appeal to us. Their condition is deplorable.

A leading Western journal was correct when it said that—"the President will hardly be able to show that during all this time eventual annexation has been regarded as a necessary outcome of our relations. The fact is that the development of annexation sentiment to any extent is of *comparatively recent date*. It was started and *cultivated* in Hawaii by the men who overthrew the monarchy and established themselves in power—not by the *popular choice*, but by forcible usurpation—and it was not until *this* change that there was any serious thought or talk in the United States of "annexing the Hawaiian Islands."

No political party, no Senator, nor Representative has a right to indirectly invite taxation upon our own people by *forever relinquishing needed revenue*—in the pursuit of a new colonial "Annexation" policy, nor give away *every year* \$8,000,000 of the revenues of the government! In view of the many objections which lie to this "annexation" scheme, the mere unsupported statement that annexation is the sequel or natural consequence of our past policy, does not meet the case where there is no pretense that the *independence* of the Islands cannot be maintained *without annexation*. With the internal factional troubles in Hawaii we have no concern and may not interfere! We owe this Hawaiian sugar oligarchy neither sympathy nor support. It came into power through duplicity, deception and fraud, under the dishonorable use made of our flag, and it is maintained by disfranchising the people! If it can maintain itself, well and good; if it cannot, let the oligarchy surrender the power it usurped *to the people of Hawaii*, but to ask the United States to "annex" the Islands with a debt of over \$4,000,000, with thousands of "contract" laborers and hundreds of lepers and give up



annually \$8,000,000 or more of needed revenue and burden ourselves forever after to support sugar planters 2,100 miles away, is little too much of a tax on the patience and liberality of the American people! It may be that the country can be made to shoulder and carry one more "Trust," and a foreign one at that, but there are many who doubt it! There is a powerful "annexation" leverage in the \$66,000,000 already wrung from our taxpayers. *There is a great deal more in the anticipated benefits which would arise under "annexation" accomplished!*

We have, and it has been our policy to have, a *coterminous*, compact territory. There is not only *strength* in it but *economy*. We have upward of 75,000,000 population in 45 States with a million of voters in Ohio and more in other States—nations in themselves—all the territory and all the people with our varied and troublesome interests that it is prudent and safe to attempt to control under a republican form of government that is as yet little more than an experiment. Our commerce and our coasts have been in greater danger than they ever will be again, unless we sacrifice a timely expenditure of money for coast defense and dry docks. Why aggravate present conditions—that need money at home, by annexing Islands over 2,000 miles away that will then need defense and thus increase the burdens of taxation in order to exploit a new political policy to meet the cupidity and avarice of selfish foreign and domestic interests and the demands of ambition, or perhaps pay a political obligation!

There remains one point, not touched upon. It is made by Senator Morgan whose *relatives* in Honolulu are doubtless ardent "annexationists." The Senator—writing from Honolulu under date of October 1, is reported as saying that—"The rapid settlement of these islands by some foreign nation is a necessary result of the conditions, in this period of activity in the movements of population, and, left to its unaided strength, the control of that immigration is beyond the power of any local government of Hawaii, whatever may be its form. Hawaii is thus forced by an overpowering necessity to seek a foreign alliance with some monarchy, or annexation to the United States, in order to control this question of immigration."

Having existed under a constitutional monarchy for nearly half a century, we are unable to discover who but the conspirators of 1893 have made a foreign alliance necessary! American immigration will continue to balance that of the English and German. Then there is nothing left but "contract" labor immigration that is *invited* into the Islands

by the cupidity of the Hawaiian "Sugar Trust." Neither the Japanese, the Chinese nor the Portuguese come in—to any extent, save through legislative appropriations. They have nearly all come that way. If there is any evil in that, the remedy is *in the hands of those who extend the invitation* and even make treaties to that end. The Senator frankly concedes this. He says—"This policy of encouraging Asiatic immigration was "instituted in the reign of Kalakaua, through the importunity "of capitalists and enterprising men, who discovered that "great wealth could be speedily acquired by the cultivation "of sugar and rice."

### "ANNEXATION" THREATENS OUR BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY.

If the scheme of annexing the Hawaiian Islands succeeds, it will seriously threaten our domestic beet-sugar industry, which has finally secured a promising start in the United States. The Hawaiian "Sugar Trust" composed of individuals and corporations have many advantages over our industry; they got government lands and lands from the natives in Hawaii for a song and Crown lands equally cheap on long (30-year) leases. 2d: They have "contract" and coolie labor, and the fertility of their soil and the climate for sugar production enables them to get two, three and even five times as much sugar per acre as can be produced in the United States. These advantages are too great for our farmers and manufacturers to overcome *on anywhere near equal terms*. In spite of this well-known fact we find the last Trans-Mississippi Congress, held at Denver in 1897, passing a resolution in favor of annexation! How our farmers were brought to such a resolution is explained by the following clipping from a leading Western paper:

"Mr. Lorrin Thurston, envoy extraordinary of Hawaiian "Island land speculators and sugar planters, turned up in the "Trans-Mississippi Congress at Salt Lake *to advocate annexation.*"

Prof. Maxwell, as director of the experiment station of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, stated the average yield of sugar per acre in the Hawaiian Islands in 1894-'5 to be 6,472 pounds or about  $3\frac{1}{4}$  tons. This is more than double the yield in the United States, and there is no doubt that under more favorable and less slovenly methods than those pursued in the Hawaiian Islands, the average yield there would reach at least 5 tons per acre. We base this upon a statement made by the Hawaiian Commercial Journal of April 21, 1896, which gave the yield of two large fields of the Ewa

plantation at 9 tons to the acre. And in the Hawaiian Planters' Monthly of December, 1894, it was stated that the estimate of yield of the Dillingham plantation, was 6 tons per acre. Mr. Z. K. Pangborn, of New Jersey, who was in Hawaii during the entire summer of 1896, says in the New York Sun of January 3, 1897, of Hawaiian sugar lands:

"The lands where sugar cane can be raised are the most "productive of any in the world, an acre of good sugar land "in Hawaii yielding twice, or more than twice, as much per "acre as any lands in Louisiana or Cuba."

Very little doubt therefore can be entertained as to the advantage which Hawaiian sugar-planters possess over our beet and cane sugar producers.

"Annexation" concerns our domestic beet-sugar industry in another way. In fact our industry to-day is in danger—because of the "reciprocity" treaty with Hawaii, and it is likewise threatened with more "reciprocity" with the West India Islands. England refuses to assist her sugar colonies with a bounty and wants the United States to support them. Our domestic sugar industry is also endangered because of the power and probable disposition of the New York "Sugar Trust,"—and foreigners *acting in competition*, to crush the life out of our beet-raisers and sugar-producers. The New York "Trust" forces its (foreign) product from the Eastern seaboard well up to and perhaps even beyond the Missouri River, *where it meets the 200,000-ton Hawaiian product coming in from San Francisco!* Thus our domestic product is in a position to be ground to powder between the upper and nether mill-stones of two gigantic "Trusts"! As sugar in Hawaii is produced by "cheap labor" and the output per acre double our own, and the freight rates *very low* from Honolulu to Missouri River points, and the total product enormous and increasing, it enters the only (local) markets on which the producers of domestic sugar can safely rely. It can be laid down cheaper than domestic sugar can be produced at a fair profit. Already arrangements appear to be on foot whereby a larger proportion of the Hawaiian product is to come in at San Francisco than heretofore. We note, in this connection, a dispatch to the Washington Post—

"TO REFINE HAWAIIAN SUGAR.—

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SENATOR PERKINS' NEW SCHEME HAS SOMETHING IN  
VIEW BESIDES BEETS.

"San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 24 —Beet sugar will not be the "only product of the Starr Mill at Crockett, when it starts up "about January 1, next. The machinery will permit of the

“refining of cane sugar as well, and the prospects are that it will take considerable of the Hawaiian crop.”

Another dispatch says—

“It is stated that the new California beet-sugar and refining company is to erect a factory at Crockett, Contra Costa County, Cal., and that it will also convert into a sugar factory the Union stock yards plant at Rodeo, Cal., which originally cost one million dollars, but which has been standing idle for five years. The Crockett plant is to be adapted to *refining Hawaiian cane sugar* as well as the manufacture of beet sugar. The company hopes to handle *considerable* Hawaiian sugar, when the contract between the Island planters and the sugar trust expires in December.”

Another San Francisco dispatch, Nov. 11, says—

“The contract of the Hawaiian planters with the Western Sugar Refinery will expire December 31, 1897. It will continue that portion of the crop, say from 40,000 to 50,000 tons, which Claus Spreckels can control. Of the remainder of 225,000 tons, 150,000 tons will be placed on the market by the California Beet Sugar and Refining Company.”

These interests in San Francisco may favor “annexation,” but they are *selfish and local*. Notwithstanding our efforts to advance and develop the beet-sugar industry at home, the above dispatches would seem to indicate that certain Senators on the Pacific Slope—to which section the home industry is very important, may be ready to lend the Hawaiian “Trust” aid and comfort. How far this “business” venture may affect votes, remains to be seen.

We wish to call attention to the fact that when the Hawaiian treaty of 1875 was originally entered into, something was said about its effect on our American sugar producers, but this was put aside by a statement that the Hawaiian sugar tonnage was too infinitesimal *to warrant any fears*. But it has developed from 30,000,000 of pounds in 1887 to over 400,000,000 of pounds in 1896.

In the discussion in the Senate over that “free” sugar treaty the friends of the Hawaiian “Trust” ignored the effect which the “free” sugar treaty was bound to have on our home sugar industry, but it was conceded by Senators who favored the job that *if it could be shown* that it would operate injuriously, *the treaty should not be ratified*. Senator Mitchell of Oregon frankly admitted, that if it were true that our domestic sugar industry was to be stricken down by the treaty, or paralyzed, then it would have a right to be heard. It would have a right, he said—“to protest against any action on the part of this government, the effect of which would

“be to strike down or seriously impair any legitimate industry  
 “whether it be the production of sugar or any other; and I  
 “take it that the Senate of the United States would be slow  
 “to give its sanction to any measure if it were apparent that  
 “such would be the effect.”

*Time has made out the case against these Hawaiian sugar planters and our domestic industry calls for judgment!* Having gotten out of our taxpayers \$66,000,000 by remission of duty on rice and sugar since 1875, we are asked to extend \$8,000,000 per annum more of benefit through “annexation.” Will this blood-sucking Hawaiian “Sugar Trust” never let go of the anatomy of our taxpayers? Must we sit idly by and see this “annexation” scheme go through in order *that a new foreign policy may be developed!*

As to the direct effect which Hawaiian “annexation” would have on our domestic beet-sugar industry, the Omaha Bee is entirely correct. It says—

“At a moderate rate of freight Hawaiian sugar will easily reach our markets as far east as the Missouri River, covering the very tract of territory in this country which is best adapted for the production of beet sugar and thus taking away from that section the possibility of marketing its product. In view of this, few capitalists would risk their money in the domestic industry. The development of the beet-sugar industry promises to give the farmers of the Western States invaluable aid. The scheme for Hawaiian annexation is directly opposed to their interests. Last year Hawaii produced 200,000 tons of sugar, practically all of which found a sale in the United States. With this production trebled under annexation she would send us 600,000 tons per year, raised by cheap coolie labor. The beet-sugar industry of the West would have small chance of growth in face of this tremendous competition.”

Another leading newspaper says—“Under annexation, Hawaiian sugar will pay no duty whatever, and have the protection of our Tariff in their favor to the extent of about 2c. per lb., there is left a margin of fully 1c. per lb. discrimination in favor of the Hawaiian sugars, as against an equal production of beet sugars in the Western sections of our country. Therefore, the beet-sugar industry of California and of all States west of the Missouri River would be directly injured by the annexation of these Islands to the extent of 1c. per lb. or more upon the strictly domestic industry. It is easy to see what a terrible blow this will give to the beet-sugar industry in the Western sections of our country and with what caution capitalists will be induced to look upon the development of this great industry.”

The farmers of Minnesota, in the Dakotas, of Wisconsin, Nebraska, Utah, Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, Texas, New York, Oregon, Washington, California and of many States in the Middle West, are deeply interested in the progress of domestic sugar production, and Senators from those States should be instructed if necessary by their legislatures *to oppose this Hawaiian "job."* It won't do for Senators to say—"we would "vote to abrogate the treaty," while they favor "annexation." Annexation means "free sugar" from Hawaii *for all time and is even worse than the existing treaty!*

If it be said that Congress will come to the relief of our domestic beet-sugar industry by giving it a small bounty to encourage the investment of additional capital to develop it and to prevent its being throttled by "free" Hawaiian sugar, the answer is that all that is in the air, besides the bounty would not only need to be liberal to counteract the future effect of free Hawaiian sugar, but such a bounty would *not be stable*; it would go off as soon as the Democrats came into power, *while "annexation" would be a fixed fact which Congress could not undo!* So that in whatever light the matter is viewed, our domestic beet-sugar industry is threatened by "annexation," beset as it already is by demands for "reciprocity" which, if acceded to, will leave domestic producers with little more than the (1.2) rate intended to be granted by the Wilson bill. In this connection we wish to call attention to the fact that notwithstanding the increase of duty on sugar by the Dingley bill, the price of standard granulated in New York is only  $\frac{1}{2}$ c. higher than it was one year ago and only  $\frac{5}{16}$ c. higher in New Orleans, and prices of labor and of factory materials have risen considerably.

Hawaiian "annexation" flies full in the face of the resolution adopted at the last National Republican Convention, on this subject—

*Resolved*, "We condemn the present (Dem.) Administration "for not keeping faith with the sugar producers of this country. The Republican party favors *such* protection as will "lead to the production on American soil of all of the sugar "which the American people use, and for which they pay "other countries more than \$100,000,000 annually."

"Annexation" is necessarily hostile to that resolve, and *the two cannot be reconciled.* The American people will surely come to wonder at these two opposite professions and some very strong reasons—outside of those glittering generalities so frequently indulged in and called "political and commercial considerations," will need to be advanced to convince the American people that something is not "rotten in Denmark."



In fact this Hawaiian matter is so odious that it reminds one of John Randolph's famous remark—

“It shines and stinks and stinks and shines,  
Like a rotten mackerel by moonlight.”

Let us protect *our own farmers* in the field and *our own labor and our own taxpayers first*. It will be time enough after that, to extend our protective hand over 2,100 miles of sea to aid another “Sugar Trust.” Suppose there is American capital in Hawaii. It had better be *at home* developing our own sugar industry! It becomes *foreign* capital when it deserts our shores and escapes our taxation for 21 years. Is American capital invested abroad in *foreign competitive* industrial pursuits to receive favor at the expense of needed revenue and of *home* capital? Is that to be the policy of this Government?



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